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are making an important contribution in protecting society from the drunken
driver, and likewise the sober driver from the undiscriminating police officer or
other witness. Certainly they are useful in rebutting the almost inevitable, "I
only had a couple of beers," or in sustaining the contention of the suspect who
claims that he staggered away from his wrecked automobile not because he was
drunk, but because the impact of the collision left him groggy.
RICHARD S. DOWNEY

THE DUBIOUS STATUS OF PEACEFUL PICKETING

The status of peaceful picketing is one of confusion when we consider the
shifitng views of the courts on the questions of what constitutes peaceful picketing, and who may participate in it. With respect to the former question, the
suggestion has been made that picketing is illegal if it is assumed to be the
exertion of an economic pressure, but on the other hand if picketing is only the
exercise of the right of free speech, it is legal.1
Distinctions have been made between the terms "picketing," 2 which at first
was presumed to be illegal, "patrolling," 3 and the use of "missionaries," 4 which
were held to be within legal bounds.
There are certain important landmarks in the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court on picketing. In 1921 the Court decided that strikers
and their sympathizers should be limited to one representative at each entrance
of an employer's plant, and all others should be enjoined from gathering or
loitering at the plant or in the nearby streets. These representatives, or "missionaries," had the right to observe, communicate and persuade, but they could only
singly approach persons willing to listen to their grievances. Furthermore, the
Court was of the opinion that these "missionaries" could only come from the
striking employees or from those hoping for re-employment in the plant.5
By 1937 the Supreme Court was beginning to inject the element of freedom
of speech into the issue of what constitutes peaceful picketing. A Wisconsin
statute6 permitted peaceful picketing and patrolling by a single person, or by
many persons, as long as it was done without coercion, intimidation, or violence.
A labor union, taking advantage of this statute, put an employer out of business
because he refused to unionize his employees. In upholding the union's right to
picket and publicize its dispute with the employer, Justice Brandeis spoke for
1.
2.

1 TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 321 (1940).
American Steel Foundaries v. Tri City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184-, 205,
42 Sup. Ct. 72, 77, 66 L. Ed. 189, 27 A.L.R. 360 (1921). "The name 'picket' indicated
a militant purpose inconsistent with peaceful persuasion."

3. Sterling Chain Theatres v. Central Labor Council, 155 Wash. 217, 283 P. 1081
4.
5.
6.

(1930). Patrolling was held to be legal if the patrol remained more than 100 feet
away from the place being patrolled.
American Steel Foundaries v. Tri City Central Trades Council, note 1 supra.
American Steel Foundaries v. Tri City Central Trades Council, supra.
Wise. Stat., sec. 103.53 (1935).

NOTES

the majority of the Court when he said, "Members of a union might, without
special statutory authorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor
dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution."7
Whether this statement should be construed to mean that picketing, or at least
peaceful picketing, is freedom of speech protected by the Federal Constitution,
or whether Justice Brandeis meant only that a union can make known the facts
of a labor dispute, as a matter of free speech-a constitutional right enjoyed by
all citizens, without saying how it can be done-is a source of great perplexity. 8
In April of 1940 the status of peaceful picketing as a form of free speech
was thought to be definitely settled when the Court handed down its decision in
the often cited cases of Thornhill v. llabama,9 and Carlson v. People of the
State of California.lO These decisions held that peaceful picketing was a form
of speech which was protected by the Constitution of the United States, and that
any state law that prohibited peaceful picketing must be struck down because it

would deny the right of free speech. These holdings seemed, at the moment, to
completely answer the question of the legal status of peaceful picketing. It was

speech; nothing more, nor less, than the dissemination of information.
With that question out of the way, the Court found an opportunity, toward

the end of the same year (1940) to answer the question as to who may participate
in this so-called dissemination of information. In Illinois a man by the name of

Swing had been operating his beauty parlor. Neither he nor any of his employees
were members of any labor union, nor did they have any desire to become mem-

bers of a labor organization. A union of those engaged in beauty work tried
unsuccessfully to unionize Swing's shop. Picketing followed. The United States
Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of Illinois, which had held that
there could be no peaceful picketing in relation to any dispute between an employer and a union unless the employer's own employees were in controversy
with him. Justice Frankfurter expressed the majority opinion of the Court when
he wrote that the right of free communication could not be "mutilated" by
denying it to workers in a dispute with an employer, even though they were not
employed by him.11
Even though it was thought that the status of peaceful picketing was settled
by the Thornhill case, 12 almost before the ink was dry in that opinion, the court
found that a state could authorize its courts to enjoin acts of picketing, which
were in themselves peaceful, when they were enmeshed with contemporaneously
violent conduct.13 Members of a milk wagon drivers' union in Chicago wished
7. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, Local No. 5, 301 U.S. 468, 478, 57 Sup. Ct.
857, 862, 81 L. Ed. 1229 (1937).

8. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 340 (Revised and enlarged ed. 1949).
9. 310 U.S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940).
10. 310 U.S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 746, 84 L. Ed. 1104 (1940).

11. American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 Sup. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed.
855 (1941).
12. See note 9 supra.
13. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies Inc.,
312 U.S. 287, 61 Sup. Ct. 552, 85 L. Ed. 836, 132 A. L. R. 1200 (1941).
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to convince non-union vendor-drivers that they should join their union so as to
be able to enjoy all its benefits. When the vendor-drivers expressed themselves
as being satisfied as they were, the union drivers smashed windows, burned the
stores of the non-union drivers' customers, and threw bombs, as well as wrecking
some trucks and shooting at the non-union drivers. The majority held that
what would otherwise have been permissible activity was rendered enjoinable by
the contempory violence. Justice Black, in the dissenting opinion, protested that
the majority of the Court had let the Thornhill Doctrine collapse on its first
attack. He thought that the proper way to avoid future objectionable picketing
was to maintain order, but not to deny free speech by enjoining all picketing.l4
Thus the Supreme Court began to limit the Thornhill Doctrine almost as soon
as it was announced.
In the Spring of 1942 the Court adopted the theory of Justice Black's
dissent in the Meadowmoor Dairiescase,15 by affirming a holding of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin which had modified an order of the Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board to read that only acts of violence were to be forbidden, thus
allowing peaceful picketing to continue. The Court was of the opinion that a
state could determine its own public policy regarding industrial relations as
long as freedom of speech was left unimpaired. 1 6
A few months later, the Supreme Court again dealt with the subject in two
opinions handed down on the same day. The first casel7 involved a union's peaceful and orderly picketing of bakeries and retail stores, which dealt with nonunion peddlers. The Court held that although a state is not required to tolerate
peaceful picketing in all places and under all circumstances, the picketing could
not be enjoined in this case, because of the peddler's mobility and the fact that
they were insulated from the public as middlemen, made it impossible for the
union to make known its grievance by any other method. This decision seemed
to add new vigor to the Thornhill Doctrine.
But the other opinion marked a further departure from the Thornhill Doctrine. A Texas restaurant operator named Ritter contracted with a non-union
contractor to have a house built in another section of town than that in which
his restaurant was located. A carpenters' union peacefully picketed the restaurant, claiming the owner was unfair to organized labor, and the restaurant
employees, being members of a union, refused to work. Union truck drivers
refused to deliver supplies to the restaurant, and union patrons stopped eating
there. The Texas court enjoined the union from picketing the restaurant, but it
did not forbid picketing at the building under construction.18 Justice Frank14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies
Inc., supra, 61 Sup. Ct. at 558.
See note 14 supra.
Hotel and Restaurant Employees' International Alliance v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board, 315 U.S. 437, 62 Sup. Ct. 706, 86 L. Ed. 946 (1942).
Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802 of International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 62 Sup. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 1178 (1942).
Carpenters and Joiners Union of America v. Ritter's Cafe, 149 S.W. (2d) 694
(Tex. 1941).

NOTES

furter again spoke for the majority of the United States Supreme Court. He
said that recognizing peaceful picketing as an exercise of free speech does not
imply that a state cannot restrict the sphere of communication to that directly
related to the dispute. The injunction was upheld because the picketed business
had no connection with the dispute.19 In the dissenting opinion it was claimed
once more that the majority of the Court had abandoned the doctrine of the
Thornhill case. 20 The dissenters questioned why peaceful picketing should be
subjected to any regulation at all if it were really speech-the dissemination of
information and nothing more. 2 1
In April, 1949, the Supreme Court again considered the scope of the
Thornhill Doctrine. A truck drivers' union picketed a plant in Missouri which
manufactured ice and rented frozen food lockers. The plant was completely
unionized by the CIO and the AF of L. There was no dispute between the
plant and its employees. The plant sold ice to non-union peddlers, none of
whom it employed. After the plant refused to comply with a demand by the
union that it stop selling to these peddlers, a picket line was placed around the
plant in an effort to force plaintiff to agree to stop selling ice to the non-union
peddlers. The result was that all deliveries to and from the plant by union
drivers were halted, and tenants of the storage house could not obtain their
food stuffs. The Supreme Court of Missouri found that the union was engaged
in activities which constituted a violation of a state anti-trust statute, 22 and
enjoined the union from picketing the plaintiff's plant. 23 Speaking through
Justice Black, an unanimous Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, 24 holding
that peaceful picketing could be enjoined without violating the union's constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press where such picketing was a
part of an integrated course of conduct, which was in violation of the state law.
The picketing and placards were to effectuate the purposes of an unlawful
combination and their sole, unlawful immediate objective was to induce plaintiff
to violate the Missouri law by entering a conspiracy in restraint of trade. The
court said that the general statement of the limitation of a state's power to
impair free speech in the Thornhill case 2 5 was not intended to apply to a fact
situation like that in the instant case.
While the United States Supreme Court decisions just summarized are
not exhaustive, they fairly present the views of the Court as to the nature and
allowable participants in peaceful picketing. But the picture is not a clear one.
As Professor Gregory has said,2 6 "It is hard to understand the Court's present
19.

22.
23.
24.

Carpenters and Joiners Union of America v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 62 Sup.
Ct. 807, 86 L. Ed. 1143 (1942).
See note 9 supra.
See Carpenters and Joiners Union of America v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 729,
62 Sup. Ct. 807, 810, 86 L. Ed. 1142 (1942).
Mo. Rev. Stat. sec. 8301 (1939).
Empire Storage and Ice Co. v. Giboney, 357 Mo. 671, 210 S.W. (2d) 55 (1947).
Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 Sup. Ct. 684, 93 L. Ed.

25.
26.

649 (1949).
See note 9 supra.
GREGORY, op. cit. supra note 8, at 361.

20.
21.
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position as being anything but a retreat from the Thornhill case, and this can
mean only that the majority no longer believe peaceful picketing to be speech
-the dissemination or information-and nothing more. For if they do still
believe that peaceful picketing is free speech, then they have entered on the
monstrous undertaking of denying this liberty constitutional protection whenever
they see fit to do so. As the minority (of the Court) complains, the majority
can't have itboth ways. Peaceful picketing either is or it is not an instance of free
speech under the constitution."
It is necessary to examine more particularly the power of the state to
determine its policy concerning peaceful picketing. A state has the right to
impose reasonable regulations for the protection of its citizens, their lives, and
their property. 2 7 To protect the community as a whole, a state may determine
whether the common interest will best be served by imposing some restriction upon
the weapons used to inflict economic injury in the struggle of conflicting industrial
forces. 28 Many of the state decisions emphasize that the constitutional right of
free speech is not unlimited. This is not a recent innovation of our courts. For
example, in 1917 Justice Pitney, speaking for the majority of the United States
Supreme Court, said, "The right of free speech is not so absolute that it may be
exercised under any circumstances without any qualification. Like other rights
that exist in civilized society, it must always be exercised with reasonable regard
for the conflicting rights of others." 29
The following discussion of the state court decisions is not intended to be
exhaustive of the cases; the intention is rather to point up significant decisions
in a representative cross section of states.
The Supreme Court of California has said picketing is neither unlawful
per se, nor unlawful because there is no labor dispute between an employer and
his employees, but violent picketing and untruthful picketing are unlawful.30
So where a union, in an effort to unionize employees of two bowling alleys
carried banners and signs which conveyed false and untrue information conNear v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708, 51 Sup. Ct. 625, 628, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931) ;
Carlson v. People of the State of California, 310 U.S. 106, 113, 60 Sup. Ct. 746,
749, 84 L. Ed. 1104- (1940).
28. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 25 Sup. Ct. 3, 49 L. Ed. 154 (1904); Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 372, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 144, 66 L. Ed. 254, 27 A.L.R. 375
(1921) ; Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 47 Sup. Ct. 86, 87, 71 L. Ed. 248 (1926);
Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 481, 57 Sup. Ct. 857, 863, 81
L. Ed. 1229 (1937); Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor
Dairies Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 295, 61 Sup. Ct. 552, 556, 85 L. Ed. 836, 132 A.L.R.
1200 (1940) ; Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802 of International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775, 62 Sup. Ct. 816, 819, 86
L. Ed. 1172 (1942).
29. Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 254, 38 Sup. Ct. 65, 73,
62 L. Ed. 260, L.R.A. 1918 C, 497, Ann Cas. 1918 B, 467 (1917).
30. Magill Bros. Inc. v. Building Service Employees' International Union, 20 Cal. (2d)
506, 127 P. (2d) 542 (1942).
27.

NOTES

cerning the employees and their employer, it was held that such picketing must
cease.3 1
In New Jersey, 12,000 union employees of the Western Electric Company
went on strike and picketed the plant. 4,000 other employees, not union members,
desired to remain on their jobs. Pickets congregated and marched in close formation, "belly to back," at the entrance to the plant, thus obstructing free passage
to the non-strikers. The pickets jostled, pushed and knocked down a few of
these employees. In enjoining the picketing as unlawful, the court said that the
employees' right to strike includes the right ot picket as a means of publicity,
but picketing is unlawful when large numbers of pickets congregate or march
in close formation obstructing the free passage of those who desire to enter, or
when the picketing has an immediate tendency to intimidate, and keep nonstriking employees from having free passage into the plant.32
A barber in Massachusetts, who employed no one, was picketed by a barbers'
union because he would not join the union, and because he refused to raise his
price of haircuts from $.50 to $1.00, the union price. The court found that
there was no labor dispute between the barber and the union, and held that the
picketing was an unlawful violation of an individual's right to conduct his
business free from illegal interference. 33
The courts of Washington and Colorado have also held that peaceful picketing of an employer's place of business is unlawful where the purpose of the
picketing is to force the employees to join, or to compel the employer to enter
into a contract, which would in effect compel his employees to become union
members.34 The United States Supreme Court dismissed the union's appeal of
31.

Supra note 30. Contra: Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 64
Sup. Ct. 126, L. Ed. 58 ((1943).

(Picketing was peaceful, but pickets gave impres-

sion that they had been employed in the cafe, when in fact it was operated by the
owner. Pickets told prospective customers that the food was bad, and to patronize

would aid the cause of Fascism. Held, loose language is part of give and take in
32.

economic and political controversies, and "unfair" and "fascist" do not falsify the
facts).
Western Electric Co. v. Western Electric Employees Ass'n., 137 N.J. Eq. 489, 45 A.

(2d) 695 (1946).
Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N.E. (2d) 12, 14, 2 A.L.R. (2d) 1190 (1947).
(After stating that Massachusetts decisions would not sanction, as lawful, a combination to picket a competitor for the purpose of attempting to regulate the details
of business, Justice Qua said, "If picketing is speech it is certainly also much
more. However peacefully it may be carried on, it possesses elements of compulsion
upon the person picketed which bear little relation to the communication to any
one of information or ideas. And resort is commonly had to it precisely because of
these elements which, much more than any force of argument contained in it, give
it the power it possesses. To fail to recognize these facts is to put reality aside. It
would seem, therefore, that even if picketing is constitutionally protected in its
aspect as speech, it must, because of its other aspects, be subject to some degree of
regulation as to circumstances, manners, and even objects, lest orderly existence be
submerged in a flood of picketing by groups of people, having no peculiar right of
their own, to make other people do what they do not wish to do and as free men
are under no obligation to do.")
34. Swenson v. Seattle Central Labor Council, 27 Wash. (2d) 193, 177 P. (2d) 873, 170
A.L.R. 1082 (1947) ; Gazzam v. Building Service Employees International Union,
29 Wash. (2d) 488, 188 P. (2d) 97 (1948) ; Denver Milk Producers Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen, and Helpers' Union,
33.

116 Colo. 389, 183 P. (2d) 529 (1947).
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the Colorado case, refusing to decide the constitutional issues involved because
the record was inadequate.35
In New York an unlawful purpose test was applied to enjoin the picketing of New York City retail stores which were supplied by a New Jersey slaughterer and packer of kosher poultry. The purpose of the picketing was to persuade
the New York City stores not to handle the New Jersey poultry, in order to insure
that members of the defendant union would be employed to slaghter all kosher
poultry consumed in the city of New York. The court held that if the union's
objective is not permitted by the common law and the statutes of the state, the
picketing is unlawful and may be enjoined. The unlawful purpose was the
attempt to erect an embargo against the importation of food into a large city.36
Three of the most recent cases affecting the status of peaceful picketing
were decided by the Supreme Court of Washington in June of 1949.37 These
cases hold that when there is no labor dispute,38 that is, a controversy between
an employer and his employees, a union's picketing is unlawful and may be
enjoined. And further, when the purpose of the picketing is that of coercion
9
rather than persuasion, it is enjoinable.3 Justice Steinert of the Washington
Supreme Court has indicated that the use of any set formula used to decide the
issues of peaceful picketing will confuse the issues. He contends that it is a fallacy
to say, "The right of free speech is protected by the constitution; the supreme
court of the United States has held that peaceful picketing is an exercise of the
right of free speech; the picketing here involved was peaceful; therefore, it
follows that the picketing in this instance is protected by the constitutional
provisions." 4 0
In resolving the question of what constitutes peaceful picketing, and who
may participate in it, in the light of recent state decisions, it appears that peaceful
41
when there is intimidation
picketing may be enjoined when it is untruthful,
4
(as in mass picketing),42 when there is no labor dispute, when it is used to
44
foster an unlawful objective of a union, and when its purpose is that of coercion rather than persuasion. 4 5 All of the above, however, is without any force if
35.
36.
37.

38.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

334 U.S. 809, 68 Sup. Ct. 1015, 92 L. Ed. 1741 (1948).
Mayer Bros. Poultry Farms v. Meltzer, 80 N.Y.S. (2d) 874, 274 N.Y. App. Div.
Rep. 169 (1948).
Hanke v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and
Helpers' Union, 207 P. (2d) 206 (Wash. 194-9); Cline v. Automobile Drivers and
Demonstrators Local Union No. 882, 207 P. (2d) 216 (Wash. 1949) ; Pacific Navigation and Trading, Inc. v. National Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots of
America, West Coast Local 90, 207 P. (2d) 221 (Wash. 1949).
1 TELLER, op. cit. supra note 1 at 419. Labor dispute, "a quarrel between employer
and employee as to the terms and conditions of employment." Non-labor dispute,
"any dispute between two people or groups of people whose relationship to each
other are not those of employer and employee."
See note 37 supra.
Hanke v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers' Union, 207 P. (2d) 206, 212 (Wash. 1949).
See note 30 supra.
See note 32 supra.
See notes 33, 34, 35, and 37 supra.
See note 36 supra.
See note 37 supra.
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peaceful picketing is considered merely free speech. As Justice Schwellenbach of
the Supreme Court of Washington has said, "The United States Supreme Court
has established this rule: Peaceful picketing is an exercise of the right of free
speceh. Organized labor has the right to communicate its views either by word
of mouth or by the use of placards. This is nothing more nor less than a method
of persuasion. But when picketing ceases to be used for the purpose of persuasion
-just the minute it steps over the line from persuasion to coercion-it loses the
protection of the constitutional guaranty of free speech, and a person or persons
injured by its acts may apply to a court of equity for relief." 46 On the question
of regulating peaceful picketing, Justice Douglas in a concurring opinion in
the Wohl case4 7 said, "Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech,
since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a
picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the
nature of the ideas which are being disseminated. Hence those aspects of picketing
make it the subject of restrictive regulation."
The realm of uncertainty surrounding the status of picketing may grow
and recede as the views of our courts shift to adhere to the social and economic
conditions prevailing at the particular time they are called upon to settle conflicts between management and labor. The words of Professor Teller seem to
be as true today as they were in 1940, when he wrote, "The story whcih comprehends the nature and consequently the extent of legal protection afforded picketing is one which, like a serial, will be told in future installments. It cannot
be stated with certainty today that picketing is an instrument primarily in the
nature of economic warfare nor can it be said that it is equivalent to the exercise
of free speech." 48
HOWELL C.

TERMINATION OF

A

McDANEL, JR.

WAR

Statements that "courts judicially know . . . the date of the termination

of the war"l are correct but the actual date of which the courts take judicial
cognizance is subject to considerable variance. Selection of the actual date follows
a definite pattern for actions which might be classified as public ;2 and a different
pattern for those actions between private individuals and corporations. One
exception to the rule for private actions3 will be discussed later.
One might think that the segregation of actions into "public" and "private"
would cause some trouble; but no case has been found where the court was in
193, 177 P. (2d) 873,

46.

Swenson v. Seattle Central Labor Council, 27 Wash. (2d)
880, 170 A.L.R. 1082 (1947).

47.

Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802 of International Brotherhood of

Teamsters v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776, 62 Sup. Ct. 816. 819, 86 L. Ed. 1178 (1942).
1 TELLER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 442.
1. 31 C.J.S. See. 62, p. 640; 20 Am. Juris, Evidence Sec. 62, p. 83.

48.

2. i.e. involving a subdivision of government, or an activity entrusted during a war to
a government department.
3. Malbone Garage, Inc., v. Minkin, 272 App. Div. 109, 72 N.Y.S. (2d) 327 (1947).

